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BL
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| Record Number
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873361
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| Main Entry
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Mendelovici, Angela A.,1982-
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| Title & Author
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The phenomenal basis of intentionality /\ Angela Mendelovici.
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| Publication Statement
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New York :: Oxford University Press,, 2018.
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource
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| ISBN
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0190863811
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: 9780190863814
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0190863803
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9780190863807
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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| Contents
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Cover; Half title; Series page; The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Overview; Part One Introduction; 1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 1.1 Aboutness and Directedness; 1.2 The Ostensive Way of Fixing Reference; 1.3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference; 1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition; 1.5 Conclusion; 2. Goals and Methodology; 2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?; 2.2 Theory-Independent Access to Intentionality; 2.3 Conclusion; Part Two Alternative Theories of Intentionality; 3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
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3.1 Tracking Theories3.2 Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories; 3.3 Background and Assumptions; 3.4 A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color Representations; 3.5 Other Mismatch Cases; 3.6 Objections; 3.7 Reliable Misrepresentation and the Significance of Tracking; 3.8 Conclusion; Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem; 4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again; 4.1 The Functional Role Theory; 4.2 Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories; 4.3 Worries with Long-Arm Functional Role Theories
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4.4 The Real Problem with Both Tracking Theories and Functional Role Theories4.5 Conclusion; Part Three The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.1 The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.2 Arguments for PIT; 5.3 Identity PIT; 5.4 Challenging Cases; 5.5 Conclusion; Appendix B: The Extent of Phenomenal Intentionality; Appendix C: The Multiple Arisability of Intentional States; 6. PIT's Status as a Theory of Intentionality; 6.1 Is PIT a Theory of Intentionality in Terms of Phenomenal Consciousness?; 6.2 Is PIT Trivial?; 6.3 Is PIT Interesting?
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6.4 Is PIT Naturalistic?6.5 Conclusion; Part Four Challenging Cases; 7. Thought; 7.1 The Challenge for PIT from Thought; 7.2 Thoughts' Phenomenal Contents; 7.3 Self-Ascriptivism about Thoughts' Alleged Contents; 7.4 Is Derived Mental Representation a Type of Intentionality?; 7.5 Conclusion: PIT about Thought; Appendix D: Derived Mental Representation in Perception; Appendix E: Attitudes; 8 Nonconscious States; 8.1 The Problem with Nonconscious States; 8.2 Derivativist Strategies; 8.3 Standing States; 8.4 Allegedly Nonconscious Occurrent States; 8.5 Conclusion; Part Five The Aspect View
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9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content?9.1 The Relation View and the Aspect View; 9.2 Two Worries with the Relation View; 9.3 The Alleged Virtues of the Relation View; 9.4 Conclusion; Appendix F: The Aspect View and Adverbialism; Appendix G: Contents as First- or Second-Order States or Properties; Appendix H: An Internal Theory of Truth and Reference; Part Six Conclusion; 10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena; 10.1 Return to Other Ways of Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 10.2 Radical Internalism; Glossary; Bibliography; Index
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| Abstract
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Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states.
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| Subject
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Subject
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Phenomenology.
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Subject
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Phenomenology.
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| Subject
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PHILOSOPHY-- Movements-- Humanism.
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| Dewey Classification
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128/.2
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| LC Classification
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B105.I56M46 2018eb
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