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BL
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| Record Number
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874015
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| Main Entry
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Shieh, Sanford,1962-
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| Title & Author
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Necessity lost : : modality and logic in early analytic philosophy.\ Sanford Shieh.
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| Edition Statement
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First edition.
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| Publication Statement
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Oxford, United Kingdom :: Oxford University Press,, [2019]
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, ©2019
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource
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| ISBN
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0191871141
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: 0192568809
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: 9780191871146
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: 9780192568809
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0199228647
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9780199228645
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| Bibliographies/Indexes
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Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
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| Contents
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Cover; Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy: Volume I; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Abbreviations; Introduction; Necessity Lost: Frege; Necessity Lost: Russell; Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained; Lewis; Wittgenstein; Closing Remarks; PART I: Frege; 1: The Modalities of Judgment; 1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic; 1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic; 1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic; 1.1.3 Problems of Traditional Logic; 1.1.4 The Fregean Solution; 1.2 Frege's Early Conception of Judgment; 1.3 Frege against Kant in Begriffsschrift
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1.4 Modality in Frege's Begriffsschrift2: Amodalism; 2.1 Two Interpretations of Frege on Modality; 2.2 Truth is Absolute; 2.2.1 Against Hilbert and Korselt; 2.2.2 Thoughts are not Temporal or Spatial; 2.3 Amodalism; 2.4 Early Truth Absolutism and Amodalism; 2.5 Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism; 3: From Judgment to Amodalism; 3.1 Judgment and Truth after the Sense/Reference Distinction; 3.2 Redundancy against the Predication Analysis; 3.2.1 More Varieties of Redundancy; 3.2.2 Doubts about Redundancy; 3.2.3 Summary; 3.3 The Indefinability of Truth; 3.4 What is a Step to a Truth-Value?
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3.5 The Recognitional Conception of Judgment3.5.1 The Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments; 3.5.2 Judgment as Recognition; 3.5.3 Recognition as Step to the Level of Referents; 3.5.4 Thoughts (Gedanken) as Representations (Vorstellungen); 3.5.5 The Constitution of the Step to a Truth-Value; 3.5.6 The Recognitional Conception and Redundancy; 3.5.7 Nugatio ab Omnia Nævo Vindicatus; 3.5.8 Two Worries; Isn't the Recognitional Conception a Correspondence Theory of Truth?; Aren't Vorstellungen Psychological?; 3.5.9 The Recognitional Conception and Object-Relation Interpretations
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3.5.10 Recognition and Acknowledgment3.6 Judgment, Judging, and Factivity; 3.6.1 Against the Factivity of Fregean Judgment; 3.6.2 For the Factivity of Fregean Judgment; 3.6.3 Judging vs. Judgment; Holding True vs. Acknowledgment of Truth; 3.6.4 The Independence of Truth from Acknowledgment of Truth; 3.6.5 A Letter to Jourdain; 3.7 Apparent Thoughts; 3.8 The Basic Argument for Truth Absolutism; 3.9 The Basic Argument before the Sense/Reference Distinction?; 3.10 A Concluding Remark; 4: The Truth in Modalism; 4.1 Parts of Thoughts
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4.1.1 Between Begriffsschrift and the Sense/Reference Distinction4.1.2 After the Sense/Reference Distinction; 4.1.3 Multiple Analyses; 4.2 Fregean Accounts of Temporalism; 4.2.1 Senses expressed as a Function of Time; 4.2.2 Another Argument against Temporalism; Redundancy and Temporalism; Propositional Attitudes or Compound Thoughts?; 4.2.3 Senses presenting Times as Parts of Thoughts; 4.2.4 Temporal Modal Discourse; 4.3 Fregean Accounts of Circumstantialism; 4.3.1 A Parallel to Temporalism; 4.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts, I; 4.3.3 Metaphysical Modal Discourse, I
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| Abstract
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Philosophers since Aristotle have traditionally held that impossibilities make up the nature of logic. Sanford Shieh investigates an important but underexplored break with this tradition: Frege and Russell questioned whether there really are such things as possibilities or necessities, and sought the foundations of logic elsewhere.
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| Subject
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Analysis (Philosophy)
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| Subject
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Logic.
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Analysis (Philosophy)
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| Subject
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Logic.
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PHILOSOPHY-- Logic.
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| Dewey Classification
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160
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| LC Classification
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BC199.M6S55 2019
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