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BL
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891456
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| Main Entry
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Meinertsen, Bo R.
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| Title & Author
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Metaphysics of states of affairs : : truthmaking, universals, and a farewell to Bradley's regress /\ Bo R. Meinersten.
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| Publication Statement
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Cham :: Springer,, 2019.
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| Series Statement
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Philosophical Studies Series ;; volume 136
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| Page. NO
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1 online resource
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| ISBN
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9789811330681
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: 9811330689
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9789811330674
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9811330670
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| Contents
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Preface; Précis; Part I-The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its two Rivals; Part II-The Constituents of States of Affairs; Part III-The Unity of States of Affairs; Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 A State of Affairs Ontology; 1.2 Approach, Assumptions and Restrictions; 1.2.1 Approach; 1.2.2 Assumptions; 1.2.3 Restrictions; 1.3 The Main Problem of State of Affairs Ontology: Initial Thoughts; 1.4 The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its Two Rivals; 1.5 Betti's Criticism of States of Affairs; References; The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its Two Rivals
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2 Truthmaking2.1 Truthmaking, Two Other Roles, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason; 2.2 Three Approaches to Truthmaking; 2.3 The Relation of Truthmaking; 2.3.1 Which Kind of Entity Are Truth-Bearers?; 2.3.2 Truthmaking; 2.4 Truthmaking at Work; 2.5 TM-Reducibility; References; 3 A Partial Look at Trope Theory; 3.1 Basic Trope Theory; 3.1.1 Selective Introduction of Tropes; 3.1.2 The Simpleness of Tropes: Is It Enigmatic or Does It Lead to Absurdity?; 3.1.3 'Free-Floating' Is Irrelevant to Relational Tropes; 3.1.4 Mertz's Argument that Nominalism Requires the Elimination of Relations
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3.1.5 Trope Theory and Truthmaking: From Bundles to Substances and Attributes?3.2 The Nuclear Theory; 3.2.1 The Problem of Non-substantial Change; 3.2.2 The Nuclear Theory as a Solution to the Problem of Non-substantial Change; 3.2.3 The Nuclear Theory and Contingent Predication; References; 4 A Partial Look at Moderate Realism; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Principles of Moderate Realism; 4.2.1 Moderate Realism 'for the Sake of Argument'; 4.2.2 Exclusivity and Uniqueness of Relation Instances; 4.2.3 The Universals of Moderate Realism; 4.2.4 Ontic Predication; 4.2.5 Thick Particulars as Networks
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4.3 The Simpleness of Relation InstancesReferences; The Constituents of States of Affairs; 5 Bare Particulars; 5.1 Bare Particulars and Thick Particulars; 5.2 The Bareness of Bare Particulars Is That They Instantiate Their Properties; 5.3 Interlude: Bare Particulars as Individuators; 5.4 Bare Particulars Are the Reason for the Particularity of States of Affairs; 5.5 The Generalization Argument: The Particulars in States of Affairs Are Always Bare; References; 6 Properties; 6.1 Properties and States of Affairs; 6.1.1 Terminology
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6.1.2 Predicates and Armstrong's Tripartite Division of Properties6.1.3 Some TM-Reducible Kinds of Property; 6.1.4 Universals in States of Affairs; 6.2 Are There Conjunctive Universals?; 6.2.1 Introduction; 6.2.2 Mellor's Argument from Ramsey's Test; 6.2.3 Conjunctive Universals in Armstrong; References; 7 Relations; 7.1 The Three Basic Kinds of Relation; 7.1.1 Internal and External Relations; 7.1.2 Grounded Relations; 7.2 Butchvarov's Phenomenological Argument Against Relations; 7.3 Direction: Some Armstrongian Remarks; 7.3.1 Direction as a Feature of Non-symmetrical Relations
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| Subject
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Bradley, F. H., (Francis Herbert),1846-1924.
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Bradley, F. H., (Francis Herbert),1846-1924.
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| Subject
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Attribute (Philosophy)
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Metaphysics.
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Ontology.
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Substance (Philosophy)
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Universals (Philosophy)
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Attribute (Philosophy)
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Metaphysics.
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Ontology.
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PHILOSOPHY-- Metaphysics.
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Substance (Philosophy)
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Universals (Philosophy)
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| Dewey Classification
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111
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| LC Classification
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B105.U5
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