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" Diversity, Institutions and Economic Outcomes "
Santacreu Vasut, Estefania
DeLong, J.Bradford
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Latin Dissertation
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English
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| Record Number
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897567
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TL0gx5w2kw
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| Main Entry
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Rocker, Dominique Ashley
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Diversity, Institutions and Economic Outcomes\ Santacreu Vasut, EstefaniaDeLong, J.Bradford
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| Date
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2010
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2010
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| Abstract
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Why may social diversity be bad for growth? In this thesis, I argue that diversity affects the extent of information asymmetries that determine the design of contracts and institutions. Because information asymmetries generate information rents, these contracts and institutions foster lower economic growth and persist over time. I proceed as follows: First, I model the impact of workforce diversity on the design of contracts and the shape of the firm. I find that diversity decreases the incentives given in principal-agent interactions and multiplies the number of layers bureaucracies need. Furthermore, the relation between diversity and productivity is institution dependent. Second, I compare the spread of industrialization in Japan and British India; and I provide new evidence of the organization, managerial beliefs, and workforce diversity of the three biggest textile centers in Bombay province. I find that workforce diversity was pervasive in British India, but not in Japan, allowing the latter but not the former to introduce organizational improvements and develop. In British India, centers with higher workforce diversity had more supervisors per worker and their managers were the most likely to believe that their workers were lazy.
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Santacreu Vasut, Estefania
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UC Berkeley
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