Two Approaches to the Distinction between Cognition and ‘Mere Association’

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" Two Approaches to the Distinction between Cognition and ‘Mere Association’ "
Buckner, Cameron

Document Type	:	AL
Record Number	:	936233
Doc. No	:	LA1x28x459
Language of Document	:	English
Main Entry	:	Buckner, Cameron
Title & Author	:	Two Approaches to the Distinction between Cognition and ‘Mere Association’ [Article]\ Buckner, Cameron
Title of Periodical	:	International Journal of Comparative Psychology
Volume/ Issue Number	:	24/4
Date	:	2011
Abstract	:	The standard methodology of comparative psychology has long relied upon a distinction between cognition and ‘mere association’; cognitive explanations of nonhuman animals behaviors are only regarded as legitimate if associative explanations for these behaviors have been painstakingly ruled out. Over the last ten years, however, a crisis has broken out over the distinction, with researchers increasingly unsure how to apply it in practice. In particular, a recent generation of psychological models appear to satisfy existing criteria for both cognition and association. Salvaging the standard methodology of comparative psychology will thus require significant conceptual redeployment . In this article, I trace the historical development of the distinction in comparative psychology,distinguishing two styles of approach. The first style tries to make out the distinction in terms of the properties of psychological models, for example by focusing on criteria like the presence of rules & propositions vs. links & nodes. The second style of approach attempts to operationalize the distinction by use of specific experimental tests for cognition performed on actual animals. I argue that neither style of criteria is self-sufficient, and both must cooperate in an iterative empirical investigation into the nature of animal minds if the distinction is to be reformed.