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" Desert, retribution, and torture / "
Stephen Kershnar.
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BL
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| Record Number
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993727
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| Doc. No
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b748097
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| Main Entry
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Kershnar, Stephen
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| Title & Author
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Desert, retribution, and torture /\ Stephen Kershnar.
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| Publication Statement
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Lanham, MD :: University Press of America,, 2001.
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| Page. NO
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xiv, 202 pages ;; 21 cm
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| ISBN
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0761821538
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: 9780761821533
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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| Contents
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Introduction: Retributivism ; Retributivism and the criminal justice system -- Section one: Desert. The structure of punitive desert. A reductive account of punitive desert ; Some implications of the structure of punitive desert -- The basis of deserved punishment is a culpable wrongdoing. The act theory and the character theory of deserved punishment ; If the act theory is correct, then the relevant type of act is a culpable wrongdoing ; The argument for the act theory of deserved punishment -- The justification of deserved punishment via general moral principles. Refutation versus merely casting doubt on this type of argument ; Theories that attempt to justify the principle of deserved punishment via more general moral theories ; Skepticism about deserved punishment -- Section two: Retributivism. A defense of retributivism. What is retributivism? ; An argument for retributivism ; Objections to impure moral retributivism -- Reflexive retributive duties. The victim has a moral duty to punish the culpable wrongdoer ; The duty to punish the culpable wrongdoer is owed to the victim ; The retributive duty and the libertarian-duty thesis -- Rights forfeiture in the context of culpable wrongdoing. The argument for rights waiver ; A culpable wrongdoer does not waive her moral right through a promise or consent ; The structure of rights forfeiture ; The justification of rights forfeiture -- Section three: Harsh punishment. Mercy and harsh punishment. Mercy is an imperfect duty ; Mercy does not prevent the regular imposition of harsh punishment -- An argument for the use of torture as punishment. The argument for torture as justified punishment.
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| Abstract
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In general, there are two ways in which punishment is justified. Forward-looking justifications look to the good results that punishment brings about and that therefore occur after it. These results include the wrongdoer being deterred, incapacitated, or improved, as well as the deterrence of would-be wrongdoers, a decrease in costs associated with crime prevention, less fear in the community, and the promotion of hatred and disgust for actions that victimize others. In contrast, backward-looking justifications look to events that occurred before the punishment. On this approach, punishment is not justified via the good results that it brings about. The dominant backward-looking justification is retributivism. According to it, the wrongdoer in virtue of his past act deserves punishment and this desert justifies punishment. This book is an in-depth defense of retributivism. Since punitive desert lies at the heart of retributivism, it is important to provide an analysis of it. This is the focus of the first part of the book. I argue that punitive desert has to do with punishment being an intrinsically valuable event, where its value results from its standing in a certain relation to a person's having culpably performed a wrongdoing. I argue that this type of desert does not by itself contain moral duties to act in any way. In particular, it does not impose on someone the duty to punish a wrongdoer. This results in retributivism being more complex than the traditional accounts, since it must therefore involve duties that refer to but are not constituted by punitive desert. I also argue that punitive desert is independent of the wrongdoer's moral character and instead rests solely on a person's acts. Lastly, I argue that the value of punitive desert cannot be accounted for via more fundamental moral considerations. This results in punitive desert being a rather primitive moral notion in that it is not justified via more fundamental moral values. Like other intrinsically good things, e.g. friendship, and other intrinsically bad things, e.g. promise-breaking, punitive desert can be used to explain why certain states of affairs are both good and right.--Adapted from introduction.
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Punishment.
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Retribution.
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Punishment.
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Retribution.
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SOCIAL SCIENCE / Penology.
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| Dewey Classification
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364.6/01
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| LC Classification
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HV8693.K47 2001
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